Timber companies in cameroon Missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired at the U.S. base are neutralized at Erbil International Airport in Erbil, Iraq, on February 28, 2026. (Photo by Ahsan Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Anadolu via Getty Images
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran, launched on February 28 and concluded with the fragile ceasefire that took effect on April 8, saw Iraqi Kurdistan endure an unprecedented number of Iranian and Iran-backed militia missile and drone attacks.
While U.S. and British air defenses helped shield the autonomous region’s capital city, Erbil, the region’s critical lack of any independent air defenses once again became glaringly apparent. And it’s still unclear whether the region can even acquire air defenses for self-protection any time soon. The Pentagon’s latest Lead Inspector General report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State campaign in Iraq and Syria, covering the first quarter of 2026, highlighted this crucial lack of capability. It also highlighted notable attacks on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region throughout the war.
These included repeated attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces stationed on the grounds of Erbil International Airport, rocket attacks targeting Kurdish leadership residences, and a fatal March 24 attack that killed six Kurdish Peshmerga troops and wounded an estimated 30. “Air defense systems operated by U.S. forces intercepted dozens of missile and drone attacks in the IKR, but only in the vicinity of U.S. facilities,” the report noted.
“Kurdish Peshmerga lack significant defenses to cover the rest of the IKR, leaving their forces and energy infrastructure highly vulnerable to attacks.”
Even on the eve of the war, analysts cited in this space warned that areas outside of the coalition’s air defense of the airport and the sprawling American consulate would become “open season” for Iran and its Iraqi militia proxies. Nevertheless, the airport-based defenses did extend some general defense of the Kurdish capital during the war. As detailed here, American Raytheon Coyote and British Rapid Sentry systems provided an effective shield against drone strikes.
A U.S. MIM-104 Patriot system, which has been intermittently based in Erbil since 2020, most likely intercepted the Iranian ballistic missiles. The Kurdistan Regional Government officially tallied 809 attacks as of April 25, 477 of which targeted Erbil province.
“According to the data, despite its neutrality in the conflict, the Kurdistan Region ranks first among non-combatant territories in terms of casualties and material damage,” the KRG Department of Media and Information noted in a report. “The attacks have resulted in 20 martyrs and 123 wounded, while hundreds of citizens have suffered material losses affecting their homes, workplaces, and vehicles.”
As of May 21, the local Kurdish Rudaw Media Network tallied 855 drone and missile attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan since February 28. It estimates these attacks, including post-ceasefire strikes, killed a total of 20 and injured 128. Had the U.S.-led coalition not been present in Erbil, the fatalities and damage could’ve been significantly higher. The U.S. already withdrew its remaining troops from Iraq’s federal provinces last year under a 2024 agreement to gradually end the anti-Islamic State coalition deployment.
Under that deal, they are scheduled to leave Erbil by this September. It’s unclear whether it will meet this deadline or negotiate a new framework to retain a presence in Erbil. The latest Inspector General report noted that the coalition “temporarily suspended advisory support to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and Peshmerga due to urgent protection issues and the Iranian threat” during the war. While “U.S. forces plan to resume their advisory support at the conclusion of OEF (Operation Epic Fury) as conditions permit,” it immediately noted that the “current memorandum of understanding for advisory support with the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs is due to expire in September.”
The report also noted that while counter-Islamic State operations with the Peshmerga were disrupted by the war, the coalition still “coordinated with the Peshmerga throughout the quarter on air and missile defense and counter-Iran operations.”
If the coalition does completely withdraw by September, Iraqi Kurdistan may find itself more exposed to future Iranian and militia drone attacks, which are a strong possibility as evidenced by the fact that Iran has continued regularly striking parts of Iraqi Kurdistan despite the April 8 ceasefire. While the region could never realistically expect the U.S. to supply high-end anti-ballistic systems like the Patriot, analysts believe more cost-effective drone defenses, such as the Coyote, could be a more feasible option.
But even here, there is no indication that Iraqi Kurdistan can secure the acquisition of even short-range systems for the point defense of critical infrastructure such as airports and government buildings. The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision “to equip and train Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces to defend against attack by missiles, rockets, and unmanned systems.” However, no known transfer of air defense assets to the Kurdish forces has occurred.
Iraqi Kurdistan’s Prime Minister Masrour Barzani highlighted his region’s urgent need for defenses against drones and missiles in February 2024. By then, analysts outlined how the NDAA’s provision to arm Iraq with equivalent systems could ultimately scupper any Kurdish acquisition, or at least delay it indefinitely.
Political elements in Baghdad loyal to Iran were no doubt happy to stall any Iraqi acquisition if it meant Iraqi Kurdistan couldn’t get any of those same systems, which may well have been precisely what happened. After all, since it’s not an independent country, Iraqi Kurdistan cannot acquire or purchase any advanced military hardware, even purely defensive systems, without Baghdad’s authorization. And Iraqi Kurdistan certainly cannot count on the central government to provide air defenses if the coalition leaves. During the war, as the Kurdish region faced bombardments from Iran and Iraqi militias in the federal provinces, Iraq’s interior ministry announced a contract for anti-drone systems and specified it would not extend this essential protection to Erbil. More generally, Iraq isn’t relying on America for its air defense. Baghdad has secured deals for medium-range Cheongung-II air defense missile systems from South Korea and short-range Korkut anti-aircraft guns from Turkey, which could theoretically provide the country with a layered defense against everything from low-flying drones to ballistic missiles. With these orders, Baghdad can forgo any American provision, especially if it would spite Erbil’s efforts to secure even a limited independent air defense capability.
Still, powerful Iran-aligned political factions in Baghdad would undoubtedly want to stymie any Iraqi Kurdish acquisition of air defenses. Nevertheless, that doesn’t necessarily mean Iraq won’t ultimately deploy some air defenses to protect critical infrastructure. Iraq buys electricity from the autonomous Kurdish region.
Iraqi Kurdistan has radically improved electricity supply to its residents through the Runaki, Kurdish for “light,” project, which has largely reduced its reliance on polluting diesel generators. Much of this supply relies on gas extracted from the Khor Mor field, which has come under repeated militia rocket and drone attacks. After a May 2024 attack, this space outlined how Iraq’s Russian-made Pantsir-S1 systems could provide point defense for Khor Mor against such threats, securing energy supplies to both the autonomous region and the federal provinces.
No such deployment happened. However, after another attack in November 2025, which interrupted 80 percent of Iraqi Kurdistan’s electricity supply, an investigative committee commissioned by the central government recommended establishing an integrated air defense system at Khor Mor coordinated between Baghdad and Erbil. Some of Iraq’s 20 new Korkuts could potentially fulfill that role in the future. Whether Baghdad has the political will to do so, even though it would again be in its self-interest, again remains to be seen. While it’s arguably clearer than ever that Iraqi Kurdistan urgently needs air defenses, it remains equally unclear where or how it can get them.